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Religious Expression and Symbolism in the
American Constitutional Tradition:
Governmental Neutrality, But Not Indifference
DANIEL 0. CONKLE*
ABSTRACT
In this article, I describe and analyze three principles of First Amendment doc-
trine. First, the Establishment Clause generally forbids governmental expression that
has the puipose or effect of promoting or endorsing religion. Second, and conversely,
private religious expression is broadly defined and is strongly protected by the Free
Speech Clause. Third, as an implicit exception to the first principle, the government it-
self is sometimes permitted to engage in expression that seemingly does promote and
endorse religion, but only when the expression is noncoercive, nonsectarian, and em-
bedded within (or at least in harmony with) longstanding historical tradition. Com-
paring these three principles to the demands of French la'fcit6, I conclude that the
United States and France share fundamental common ground on the first principle,
but that the second and third principles demonstrate that the American approach is in
some respects more protective and tolerant of religious expression in the public do-
main. I suggest that these variations are not accidental, but rather are the product of
historical, philosophical, and cultural differences.
Two recent controversies highlight the French commitment to la'citd,
which demands a strict separation of church and state. First, France has strongly
resisted the inclusion of religious language in the proposed European Constitu-
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son Poynter Scholar, Indiana University Bloomington. This article is a revised and updated ver-
sion of a paper I presented on January 28, 2005, during a conference on "La Conception
Am&icaine de la LaIcit" at the Universit6 Paris 1I (Panth~on-Assas). My original paper was pub-
lished in French as Daniel 0. Conkle, Expression et symbolisme religieux dans la tradition con.titu-
tionnelle amiricaine: neutralit de lltat, mais pas indiffirence, in LA CONCEPTION AMIRICAINE DE LA
LAYCIT 153 (Elisabeth Zoller ed., 2005). 1 wish to thank Professor Elisabeth Zoller for hosting a
wonderful conference.
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tion. Second, it has banned students from wearing Islamic headscarves and
other conspicuous religious apparel in public schools. These actions address the
relationship between church and state in the context of expression and symbol-
ism, that is, verbal or symbolic speech. Taken together, the actions suggest that
the state should be secular in its expression and that religious expression should
be confined to the private realm.
The French commitment to laYcit6 is matched by a similar commitment in
the United States, but the American constitutional tradition in this context is nu-
anced and complex. Our understanding of separation, like that of France, goes
well beyond the institutional separation of church and state. We are committed
to the idea of secular as opposed to religious government, and our national Con-
stitution is itself a secular document.' At the same time, general references to
God are commonplace in state constitutions and in other official pronounce-
ments. It is an open question whether our tradition would sanction the contem-
porary adoption of religious constitutional language such as the religious
language considered for the European Constitution. Depending on the word-
ing, however, this type of religious language might be permissible in the United
States. And there is little doubt about American constitutional principles in the
context of student religious attire. A law like the one adopted in France would
almost certainly be unconstitutional in the United States.
At first glance, the American approach to religious expression and symbol-
ism might seem confused and inconsistent. Consider the following, additional
examples. School-sponsored prayer is strictly banned from public schools, even
during graduation ceremonies and at extracurricular events, and even when of-
fered by students rather than teachers. But public schools are required to permit
students and community groups to hold religious meetings after school on the
same basis as nonreligious meetings. And even during the class day, public
school teachers-at least for the time being-may lead students in reciting the
Pledge of Allegiance to the American flag, complete with its reference to "one
Nation under God." By contrast, efforts to promote the religious content of the
Ten Commandments by posting them in public schools and in other public
buildings have been declared unconstitutional. Likewise, governmental holiday
1. See generally ISAAc KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE
CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996) (making strong historical and contemporary claims
about the secularity of the Constitution); Scott C. Idleman, Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics,
and American Constitutionalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991 (1996) (reviewing KRAMNICK &
MOORE,supra, and contending that their position is extravagant and untenable).
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displays cannot endorse the religious aspect of Christmas. Yet no one doubts the
constitutionality of our national motto, "In God We Trust," which is promi-
nently displayed on American coins and currency. And American presidents
routinely declare days of prayer and offer religiously oriented Thanksgiving
proclamations.
In this article, I will discuss the American approach to religious expression
and symbolism, suggesting that the American approach is multifaceted but not
incoherent. If the French conception of la'icit6 can be understood to require neu-
trality in the sense of governmental indifference to religion, the American ap-
proach calls for neutrality of a somewhat different character. The American
conception of neutrality-sometimes called "benevolent neutral ity" 2-generally
demands that the government not favor religion over irreligion, but, as an ap-
parent exception, it permits some governmental expression that seems to violate
this principle. Perhaps more important, the American understanding of neu-
trality grants private religious expression strong protection under the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause, including strong protection against discrim-
inatory treatment, and this protection extends to expression in public schools
and other public places. The United States and France thus share a similar com-
mitment to the separation of church and state, but the American commitment is
distinctive in significant ways.
In an attempt to explain the American approach, I will discuss three consti-
tutional principles. First, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
generally forbids governmental expression that has the purpose or effect of pro-
moting or endorsing religion. Second, and conversely, private religious expres-
sion is broadly defined and is strongly protected by the Free Speech Clause.
Third, as an implicit exception to the first principle, the government itself is
sometimes permitted to engage in expression that seemingly does promote and
endorse religion, but only when the governmental practice is noncoercive, non-
sectarian, and highly traditional in a historical sense. In closing, I will suggest
that the American departures from the French conception of la'cit6 should not
be overstated, but neither should they be ignored. I will further suggest that the
variations are not accidental, but rather are the product of historical, philosoph-
ical, and cultural differences.
2. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROHIBITION ON GOVERNMENTAL
EXPRESSION THAT PROMOTES OR ENDORSES RELIGION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, ratified in 1791, pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ...." The Establishment Clause was originally directed to the national
government alone, but the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, incorporated the Establishment
Clause and thereby extended its prohibition to state governments as well (in-
cluding their local subdivisions and public schools). Whether this conclusion is
consistent with the original understanding of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments is a matter of dispute, but for more than halfa century the Supreme Court
has declared that the Establishment Clause requires government at all levels to
be neutral toward religion. As the Court wrote in its 1947 decision in Everson v.
Board of Education, "Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other."3 Since Everson, Establishment Clause issues have arisen mainly in two
areas: challenges to governmental funding programs that extend to private reli-
gious schools or organizations, and challenges to governmental expression or
symbolic action, especially in public schools. 4 Our focus here is on the second set
of issues.
According to an oft-cited 1971 case, Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 Everson's require-
ment of neutrality demands that governmental action satisfy a three-part consti-
tutional test: it must be supported by a secular purpose; it must not have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and it cannot create an exces-
sive governmental entanglement with religion.6 In the context of governmental
expression, entanglement typically is not an issue, and the constitutional inquiry
has focused largely on the purpose and effect of the government's action. More-
over, the Supreme Court has developed a supplemental constitutional test, the
endorsement test, that refines the purpose and effect prongs of the original
Lemon test. The endorsement test focuses specifically on the symbolic character
of governmental action. This test was first proposed in 1984 by Justice O'Connor
3. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
4. See Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms,
and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2001).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Id. at 612-13.
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in her influential concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.7 According to the en-
dorsement test, the government violates the Establishment Clause if it intends to
communicate a message that endorses or disapproves religion or if its action has
the effect of communicating such a message. More specifically, the second part of
the endorsement test asks whether an "objective observer," properly informed of
the relevant history and context, would find in the government's action a mes-
sage of endorsement or disapproval. For obvious reasons, the endorsement test is
well-suited for constitutional challenges involving expression and symbolism.
The Lemon test and the endorsement test are designed in part to protect the
value of religious voluntarism, that is, the freedom of individuals to make reli-
gious choices for themselves. But governmental action can violate these tests
even in the absence of coercion and therefore even when religious voluntarism is
not seriously threatened. As a result, it is clear that these tests reflect additional
constitutional values. One such value is religious equality-equality not only be-
tween and among religions, but also between religion and irreligion. Another is
the value of respecting the religious or irreligious identity of individual citizens,
a value that in turn promotes a religiously inclusive political community. The
endorsement test, in particular, is designed to address these concerns. Govern-
mental expression that endorses or disapproves religion may not impair reli-
gious voluntarism, but it is likely to affront and alienate citizens who are
excluded from the government's symbolic favor. As Justice O'Connor wrote in
her Lynch concurrence, "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accom-
panying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the po-
litical community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."' As to the
"outsiders," the government's action may constitute not only an insult, but also a
psychological assault on the core of their self-identity. By denigrating the dis-
senters' religious or irreligious identity, moreover, the governmental action is
likely to create resentment and religious divisiveness that could threaten the
unity of the political community itself.9
Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has embraced the Lemon and
endorsement tests in the context of governmental expression, and the Supreme
Court and lower courts have used these tests to invalidate a variety of govern-
7. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 688.
9. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1113, 1172-79 (1988).
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mental actions. The Supreme Court has called for special vigilance in the public
school setting, where governmental expression raises distinctive concerns, in-
cluding concerns about the subtle coercion of impressionable children. But its
decisions stand for the broader proposition that the government-whether act-
ing within or outside the public school setting-should not itself endorse or dis-
approve religion, regardless of whether the government's action is coercive.
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has invalidated school-sponsored
prayer and religious instruction in public schools, even when student participa-
tion is designated as voluntary. Public schools are free, of course, to teach about
religion in a neutral and objective manner, as part of a secular program of in-
struction." But the Supreme Court has outlawed teacher-led prayers and devo-
tional exercises, whether composed by the government, drawn directly from the
Bible, or even-in certain circumstances-when the exercise is a moment of si-
lence."' It has prohibited school-sponsored prayers at graduation ceremonies and
extracurricular events, even when the prayers are nonsectarian and even when
they are offered by invited clergy or by students selected by their peers. 12 It has
invalidated laws precluding the teaching of human evolution and promoting the
teaching of divine creation. 3 It has precluded public schools from posting the
Ten Commandments in their classrooms." And it has ruled that public schools
cannot schedule classroom religious instruction during the school day, even
when the instructors are privately employed and when students participate only
upon the request of their parents. 5
Some of these public school cases predated Lemon and the endorsement test,
and the Supreme Court's reasoning sometimes included additional elements, in-
cluding a concern about the subtle coercion of school children. But the decisions
have rested largely on (what is now) the first part of the Lemon and endorsement
tests. Whether by law or by practice, the government, through the public
schools, was acting not with a secular purpose, but rather with the impermissible
purpose of promoting and endorsing religion. The government therefore was
10. E.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
11. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Schempp, 374 U.S. 203; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985).
12. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
13. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
14. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
15. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But cf Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a similar program of religious "released-time" in which the religious
instruction took place off the premises of the public schools, at private religious centers).
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responsible for the religious expression that took-place in these cases, making the
expression its own-in substance if not in form. As a result, the government
violated the Establishment Clause requirement of religious neutrality.
The constitutional prohibition on governmental expression that endorses or
disapproves religion extends beyond the public school setting. In particular, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the government cannot sponsor verbal or sym-
bolic public displays, including holiday displays, that convey this type of imper-
missible message. As in the public school cases, the Court has invoked the Lemon
and endorsement tests. The government can satisfy the first prong of this analy-
sis if it has included a religious element in a public display not for the purpose of
promoting or endorsing religion, but instead for a secular reason-for example,
simply to acknowledge or recognize some relevant aspect of religion. For ex-
ample, a city might include a Christian cr&he in a Christmas display not to pro-
mote or endorse Christianity, but merely to acknowledge or recognize the
religious origins of this public holiday. Just as public schools are free to teach
about religion in a neutral way, other governmental units are free to address the
topic of religion in an objective, nonpromotional manner. Needless to say, the
sincerity of this sort of asserted secular purpose might be doubted, and, if the
government's true purpose is found to be promotional, there is a violation of the
first prong." Perhaps more important, even a genuinely secular purpose will not
save a public display if it fails the second prong of the analysis. This second
prong precludes the government, whatever its purpose, from sponsoring a pub-
lic display that has the effect of promoting or endorsing religion.
Relying especially on the endorsement test and focusing mainly on its sec-
ond prong, the Supreme Court has upheld some displays and rejected others.
Under the second prong of the endorsement test, the analysis focuses not on the
government's intention but on the symbolic effect of its action. More precisely,
the question is whether a well-informed "objective observer" would conclude
that a public display including a religious element in fact conveys a message of
governmental endorsement.1 7 In resolving this question, the Court has relied on
fine distinctions. For example, it has precluded a stand-alone cr&he inside a
county courthouse, complete with a banner declaring, "Gloria in Excelsis
16. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (relying on the first prong to find
county courthouse displays of the Ten Commandments unconstitutional when the history of the
displays revealed that the counties' predominant purpose was to promote religion).
17. Cf id. at 2734 (finding the "objective observer" inquiry relevant even under the purpose
prong of Lemon).
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Deo!,"' but it has upheld a broader, city-sponsored outdoor display that in-
cluded not only a creche, but also a Santa Claus house, reindeer, other secular
symbols, and a banner reading "Seasons Greetings."' 9 Likewise, the Court has
selectively permitted the government to display the Ten Commandments on
nonschool public property, but only when the context suggested a predomi-
nantly secular message about the historical role of the Commandments and their
relationship to moral ideals. 2" Although the Court's particular decisions are
finely drawn and fact-specific, the underlying constitutional principle is clear:
the government cannot act, even unintentionally, as the sponsor of expression
that promotes or endorses religion.
Especially in the public school setting, the Supreme Court has gone to great
lengths to uncover and preclude the unconstitutional sponsorship of religious
expression. Closely examining governmental policies and intentions, the Court
has refused to tolerate attempts to circumvent its constitutional doctrine and has
invalidated such attempts as "shams." Three cases are illustrative.
In Wallace v. Jaffree,21 the Court invalidated an Alabama statute authorizing
public school teachers to lead their students in a daily period of classroom silence
"for meditation or voluntary prayer." The Court did not preclude teacher-led
moments of silence altogether, nor statutes authorizing this practice. Instead, it
focused on the precise language and history of the Alabama statute that was
under review. The Court suggested that it would uphold moment-of-silence
statutes that do not mention prayer, and it implied that statutory references to
prayer might sometimes be permissible. But the Court found that this particular
Alabama statute was "entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion ' 22 by
"convey[ing] a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer."2'3 The
18. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
19. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (5-4 decision upholding a 40-year-old display of
the Ten Commandments as one monument among many on the outdoor grounds of the Texas
State Capitol); see id. at 2868-73 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (providing the decisive
fifth vote to uphold the Ten Commandments monument and arguing that, in its particular histor-
ical context and physical setting, the monument conveyed a predominantly secular message); cf.
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (invalidating recently erected courthouse displays of framed
copies of the Ten Commandments, despite the presence of other documents as well, when the his-
tory of the displays revealed a predominantly religious purpose).
21. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
22. Id. at 56.
23. Id. at 59.
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Court noted that preexisting Alabama law had already authorized a moment of
classroom silence, without mentioning prayer, and that a key legislative sponsor
of the challenged statute had conceded that his only purpose was to "'return vol-
untary prayer' to the public schools. ' 4 The Supreme Court also cited the Ala-
bama legislature's almost contemporaneous effort to directly challenge the
Court's precedents by authorizing a prescribed spoken prayer for public school
classrooms. In context, it seemed clear that Alabama's attempt to revise its
moment-of-silence law had the same, constitutionally impermissible purpose: to
promote and endorse prayer as a favored activity in Alabama's public schools.
2 5
The Supreme Court likewise found an impermissible legislative purpose inEd-
wards v. Aguillard.29 In a previous decision, the Court had invalidated a law prohib-
iting public school teachers from teaching evolution as an explanation of human
origins. 27 At issue in Edwards, by contrast, was a Louisiana "balanced treatment"
statute. The Louisiana statute did not ban the teaching of evolution. Instead, it de-
clared that any public school that elected to teach evolution was required to teach
"creation science" as well. The state claimed that creation science reflected legitimate
scientific opinion and that the statute permitted students to confront the competing
evidence and decide for themselves. As in Wallace, however, the Court closely exam-
ined the statute and its legislative history. It concluded that the state's secular defense
of the statute was a "sham" and that, in reality, the law was not designed to promote
the teaching of diverse scientific theories. Rather, the legislature's "primary" and
"preeminent" purpose was to advance and endorse a particular religious viewpoint,
a religious understanding of creation that appeared to be drawn from a literal read-
ing of Genesis. Accordingly, the statute promoted and endorsed religious expression
in violation of the first prong of the Lemon and endorsement tests.
-2 8
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,29 the Supreme Court con-
fronted an even more elaborate attempt to avoid the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause. In an earlier case, the Court had extended its prohibition on
school-sponsored prayer beyond the classroom setting, ruling that public schools
could not invite clergy to offer prayers during graduation ceremonies." Evi-
24. Id. at 57.
25. See id. at 56-60.
26. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
27. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
28. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585-95. See id. at 597-604 (Powell, J., concurring).
29. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
30. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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dently concerned about the impact of this precedent on school-sponsored
prayers at high school football games, a public school board in Texas adopted a
policy that was designed to permit such prayers to continue, but without the
school board's formal sponsorship or imprimatur. The policy called for two
votes by the high school student body. In the first vote, the students were to de-
cide whether there would be a student-led "invocation and/or message" before
each home football game, not only "to promote good sportsmanship and student
safety," but also "to solemnize the event." If this first vote was positive, the sec-
ond vote was to elect a particular student, from a list of volunteers, to offer the
"invocation and/or message."31 The school board claimed that its policy served
secular purposes, promoting student free speech as well as sportsmanship. And
it argued that any prayers that resulted from the policy would be private student
expression not subject to the Establishment Clause.
As in Wallace and Edwards, however, the Supreme Court closely scrutinized
the situation and found an Establishment Clause violation. Examining the text
of the policy, the manner in which it would be implemented, and the school
board's previous practice of explicit sponsorship, the Court ruled that the school
board's secular justification for the policy was a "sham."3 2 The Court concluded
that the true purpose and the inevitable effect of the policy was to continue, pro-
mote, and endorse the longstanding practice of school-sanctioned prayer at the
games. As a result, the policy violated both the purpose and the effect prongs of
the Lemon and endorsement tests. Although the prayers would be uttered by
students, they would not be purely private expression. Due to the school board's
promotion and endorsement, the prayers, in reality, would be undertaken on be-
half of the school board itself. As a result, the policy was not protected by free
speech principles, but instead was invalid under the Establishment Clause.33
II. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
As just explained, a critical factor in Santa Fe was the Supreme Court's con-
clusion that it would not treat the student-led prayers as private expression. This
was critical because private religious expression is not subject to the Establish-
ment Clause. Much to the contrary, it is strongly protected by the First Amend-
31. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 298 n.6.
32. See id. at 308-09.
33. See id. at 301-10, 313-17. The Court also cited concerns about coercion. See id. at 310-13.
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ment. Perhaps surprisingly, the main source of protection for private religious
expression is not the Free Exercise Clause, which specifically addresses religion
and which forbids the government from "prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Instead, the constitutional protection springs mainly from the First Amend-
ment's Free Speech Clause, which prohibits the government from "abridging
the freedom of speech." As construed by the Supreme Court, the Free Speech
Clause extends not only to secular expression, but also to religious expression, in-
cluding prayer and worship, religious speech and instruction, and nonverbal
religious symbolism. The Free Speech Clause thereby protects not only the con-
stitutional value of expressive liberty in general, but also the value of religious
liberty in the realm of private expression.
As Santa Fe makes clear, religious expression will not be treated as private if
the expression is sponsored by the government. In the absence of such sponsor-
ship, however, religious expression will be treated as private expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment-even if the expression takes place on
governmental property, including the premises of public schools. What the Es-
tablishment Clause forbids is not religious expression, but governmental spon-
sorship or promotion of religious expression. Unlike the government, students
and other private actors generally are free to advance and endorse religion
through their speech and symbolic actions. Indeed, under the Supreme Court's
free speech doctrine, privately initiated religious expression is high-value speech
entitled to the same free speech protection as core political speech.34
Free speech doctrine provides only limited protection against the content-
neutral regulation of expression, including religious expression. Content-neutral
regulation restricts expression for reasons unrelated to its content or message. For
example, the government might impose size or location restrictions on billboards,
regardless of content, in order to promote traffic safety or visual aesthetics. Or
public schools might further their educational mission by disciplining students
who disrupt their classes by talking. These sorts of generally enforced, content-
neutral regulations probably would not violate the First Amendment even if, in
particular cases, they were applied to billboards that contained religious messages
or to students who prayed aloud while their teachers were lecturing.3
5
34. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981); Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
35. See generally Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 46 (1987).
DANIEL 0. CONKLE
Conversely, free speech doctrine strongly disfavors content-based regulation,
and especially viewpoint discrimination, due to the First Amendment's hostility
to censorship and to governmental distortions of public discourse in the "market-
place of ideas." Content-based regulation targets speech or symbolic conduct be-
cause of its communicative nature; that is, the government finds the expression
harmful or inappropriate precisely because of its subject matter or message.36
Viewpoint discrimination is a subtype of content-based regulation, a subtype that
is especially offensive to free speech values. Viewpoint discrimination targets not
merely a particular subject matter, but a particular viewpoint or perspective.
Although one could argue otherwise, the Supreme Court generally has treated
governmental action that discriminates against religious speech as not only
content-based, but also viewpoint-based. According to the Supreme Court, dis-
crimination against religious speech favors secular over religious perspectives,
thereby distorting the search for truth that freedom of speech is supposed to facil-
itate. Viewpoint discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional. As a matter of
free speech doctrine, viewpoint discrimination triggers strict judicial scrutiny of
not only regulatory penalties, but also governmental attempts to selectively deny
religious speakers access to public property. This reasoning applies to property
such as public parks, which are recognized "public forums" for First Amendment
expression. It also extends, more broadly, to other public property on which the
government has permitted private expression to take place.
The Supreme Court has developed and applied this analysis in a series of
"equal access" cases involving claims by religious speakers that they have been
improperly denied access to public property. In these cases, the religious claim-
ants have challenged governmental policies permitting the use of publicly
owned land or the after-hours use of public buildings by secular groups or for
secular purposes, but expressly precluding such use by religious groups or for re-
ligious purposes. The claimants rely on free speech, typically asserting viewpoint
discrimination. The government denies it, but goes on to argue that even if there
were a presumptive violation of free speech, the Establishment Clause would
preclude the requested access to the public property. Honoring the Establish-
ment Clause by excluding the religious speakers, the government contends,
serves a compelling interest that satisfies free speech doctrine even if strict scru-
tiny is required. In each of the cases decided thus far, however, the Supreme
36. See generally John Hart Ely, Flag Deseoation: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
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Court has accepted the challengers' free speech argument and rejected the gov-
ernment's Establishment Clause defense, essentially by finding that the govern-
ment's fear of breaching the Establishment Clause is misplaced. According to
the Court, equal access for privately initiated religious and secular speech would
not violate the Establishment Clause because it would not constitute govern-
mental sponsorship of the religious expression.
3 7
In its recent decision in Good News Club v. Mi/ford Central School,3 s the Su-
preme Court extended this reasoning to after-school religious meetings at public
schools, even for elementary students. A New York public school permitted pri-
vate groups to use the school after hours for various purposes, including charac-
ter and morals education for children. Citing this policy, an evangelical
Christian organization sought permission to hold weekly after-school meetings
for elementary school children (ages six to twelve), meetings at which the chil-
dren would sing songs, hear Bible lessons, memorize scripture, and pray. But the
school's after-hours policy expressly precluded meetings "for religious pur-
poses," and the school denied permission. The Christian organization claimed a
free speech violation, and the Supreme Court agreed, finding that the school had
engaged in viewpoint discrimination by permitting after-hours meetings to
teach the development of character and morals from a secular perspective, but
not from a religious perspective.3 9 The school's Establishment Clause argument
was unavailing, because the Court found that extending nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to the Christian group would not be an Establishment Clause violation. The
Court noted that student participation in the religious meetings required paren-
tal permission, mitigating potential concerns about coercion. In any event, the
Court found that such concerns were constitutionally significant only when
public schools themselves were sponsoring religious expression. Here, there
would be no such sponsorship. Although the religious expression would occur
on the school's premises, the school-by giving the expression equal, not prefer-
ential, treatment-would neither be promoting nor endorsing it.4"
37. See, e.g., Vincent, 454 U.S. 263; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993); Pinette, 515 U.S. 753. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995) (granting a student religious group "equal access" to public "property" in the form
of financial support from a state university's student-activities fund). But cf Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712 (2004) (permitting a state to selectively deny scholarship funding to students majoring in
devotional theology).
38. Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
39. See id. at 107-12.
40. See id. at 112-19.
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Good News Club was decided in 2001, only a year after Santa Fe.4 The con-
trasting results are striking. In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court precluded prayers be-
fore high school football games, even though the prayers would be nonsectarian,
would be offered by high school students acting as volunteers, and would take
place only a few times each year. In GoodNetvs Club, the Court permitted not only
Christian prayers, but sustained evangelical instruction, offered by adult Chris-
tian leaders to young and impressionable elementary students every week at a
public school, just after the close of the regular school day. At first glance, these re-
sults seem anomalous. Surely the religious expression that the Court permitted in
Good News Club is more likely to promote religious beliefs and practices than the
religious expression that the Court precluded in Santa Fe. But in the American
constitutional understanding, that is not the issue. The critical question is whether
the government is sponsoring or promoting the religious expression. If so, as in
Santa Fe, the government is violating the Establishment Clause. If not, as in Good
News Club, there is no Establishment Clause violation, and the Free Speech
Clause will affirmatively protect the private religious expression--even on public
property, and even on the premises of public schools.
The Free Speech Clause protects private religious expression on the pre-
mises of public schools not only after hours, but also during the school day. Reli-
gious expression by teachers or other school officials is likely to indicate school
sponsorship, as opposed to private expression. For a teacher to lead her students
in classroom prayer, for example, would clearly violate the Establishment
Clause, even if the teacher acted on her own initiative. As Santa Fe makes clear,
religious expression by student speakers also may be school-sponsored and
therefore unconstitutional. School sponsorship might be present during the reg-
ular school day if students offer prayers or other religious expression as part of
official school programs or in written publications that are sponsored and super-
vised by school officials. Purely private student speech, however, is protected by
the Free Speech Clause, and this protection extends to privately initiated prayer
and other religious expression. As the Court wrote in Santa Fe, "nothing in the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student
from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.
4 2
More generally, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Free Speech Clause
protects privately initiated student speech and symbolic expression in public
41. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
42. Id. at 313.
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schools. The leading case is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.43 In Tinker, the Court barred public school authorities from disciplining
students for wearing black armbands to school as a symbolic protest against the
war in Vietnam. In so ruling, the Court declared that First Amendment rights
extend to the public school environment and that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."44 Thus, students are free to express their personal views "in the cafeteria,
or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours."4 Stu-
dent expression can be restricted, the Court explained, only if it "materially dis-
rupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others."' The armbands in Tinker did not meet this test, despite the controversy
and distraction that they were likely to cause.
Under American free speech principles, the French ban on conspicuous re-
ligious attire in public schools would almost certainly be unconstitutional.
Under Tinker, public schools can ban student expression that would be truly dis-
ruptive. This might include derogatory references to specific racial or religious
groups. It might also include symbolic clothing that is extremely provocative or,
perhaps, symbolic clothing that largely conceals a student from view. But Tinker
would protect the wearing of conspicuous religious apparel that merely symbol-
izes a student's religious identity and commitments. It would not be enough for
the government to show that such symbolism might be controversial or distract-
ing. As the Court held in Tinker, the First Amendment protects students who
wish to engage in "a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any
disorder or disturbance. 4 7 Furthermore, the French ban applies only to "sym-
bols or clothing by which students conspicuously manifest a religious appear-
ance."48 The law directly targets religious expression, as such, for distinctive
regulation. Other symbolic apparel is not affected, no matter how controversial
43. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
44. Id. at 506.
45. Id. at 512-13.
46. Id. at 513. This standard applies to purely private student expression, that is, the expression
of students acting on their own. School officials have more leeway to control student expression
that occurs in school-sponsored programs or publications. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
47. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
48. This English translation of the French law is drawn from Elisa T. Belier, The Headscalf
Affair: The Conseil d'ttat on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society, 39 TEx. INT'L L.J.
581,581 (2004).
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or disruptive it might be. This regulation would certainly be regarded as
content-based, and, under the Supreme Court's equal-access precedents, it prob-
ably would be treated as a viewpoint-based exclusion of symbolic religious com-
munications. These precedents also would reject any claim that church-state
separation demands or supports this selective exclusion of private religious ex-
pression. The analysis of Tinker, coupled with the First Amendment's special
aversion to regulations targeting private religious expression, would lead to al-
most certain invalidation.
More generally, as we have seen, the First Amendment has been interpreted
to require a sharp distinction between private religious expression and religious
expression that is sponsored by the government, including public schools. Pri-
vate religious expression is protected by the Free Speech Clause, even when it
takes place on the premises of public schools or on other governmental property.
Governmentally sponsored religious expression, by contrast, is precluded by the
Establishment Clause. This picture is not yet complete, however, because the Es-
tablishment Clause prohibition is subject to an implicit exception.
III. AN IMPLICIT EXCEPTION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROHIBITION
ON GOVERNMENTAL EXPRESSION THAT PROMOTES OR ENDORSES RELIGION
As discussed in Part I of this essay, the Supreme Court has adopted two
complementary tests under the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test and the
endorsement test. In its formulation and application of these tests, the Court has
demanded governmental neutrality not only between and among religions, but
also between religion and irreligion. More specifically, the Court has concluded,
time and again, that the Establishment Clause forbids the government from
sponsoring verbal or symbolic expression that promotes or endorses religion,
even if the governmental action is neither coercive nor sectarian. The Court has
been especially vigilant in enforcing this prohibition in the public school setting,
closely examining governmental claims of secular justification and sometimes
dismissing those claims as "shams." But the prohibition extends to other settings
as well, including governmental promotions of religion through the use of reli-
gious elements in verbal or symbolic public displays. This understanding of the
Establishment Clause reflects the Supreme Court's general approach, and it
plainly dominates the Court's decisionmaking.
At the same time, however, the Court has indicated that the Establishment
Clause permits a narrow category of governmentally sponsored religious ex-
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pression that would appear to violate these standards. In Marsh v. Chambers, 9 for
example, the Court upheld the practice of governmentally sponsored legislative
prayer, offered before legislative bodies by publicly paid chaplains. The Court
made no pretense of applying its customary Establishment Clause doctrine. In-
stead, it emphasized that legislative prayer dates back to the First Congress of
the United States and is such a longstanding historical tradition that it is "part of
the fabric of our society."5 In dicta in other cases, the Court likewise has ap-
proved other historical practices even though they appear to constitute govern-
mental expression that promotes and endorses religion. For example, the Court
has suggested that the following practices do not violate the Establishment
Clause: presidential Thanksgiving proclamations that, since the time of George
Washington, have included religious references and appeals; the Supreme
Court's own opening cry, "God save the United States and this honorable
Court," which dates back to the early nineteenth century; our national motto,
"In God We Trust," which has appeared on selected American coins since the
1800s, which became our official motto in 1956, and which now appears on all
our coins and currency; and the statutorily prescribed language, "one Nation
under God," which has been part of the Pledge of Allegiance since 1954."
The Supreme Court has yet to offer a persuasive explanation for the constitu-
tionality of these historical governmental practices. The Court sometimes has im-
plied that these practices actually can satisfy the Lemon and endorsement tests
because the governmental expression merely acknowledges religion without pro-
moting or endorsing it. Some justices have gone further, contending that the ex-
pression has lost its religious meaning over time and now serves symbolic
purposes that are secular in nature. 52 But these arguments are difficult and la-
bored, if not contrived and disingenuous. By all indications, the governmental ex-
pression in question does promote and endorse religion, and it does so
deliberately. As the Supreme Court tacitly recognized in Marsh, the expression
therefore cannot be defended under the Court's conventional Establishment
Clause tests. Instead, the Court appears to be recognizing an implicit exception to
its conventional tests and to the general prohibition on governmental expression
that promotes or endorses religion.
49. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
50. Id. at 792.
51. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-78 (1984).
52. E.g., id. at 716-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The contours of this implicit exception are quite uncertain, in part because
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to formally recognize its existence. Yet
one can discern potential criteria by looking for common elements in the prac-
tice of legislative prayer, as described and approved in Marsh, and in the other
practices the Court has approved in dicta. First and foremost, each of these var-
ious practices has a prominent and lengthy history in the United States, and, as a
result, each has become an established feature of the American social fabric. In
addition, each practice is primarily and essentially symbolic, not coercive. The
government is promoting and endorsing religious expression; indeed, the gov-
ernment itself is speaking religiously. Yet the government is not coercing dis-
senting citizens to join or affirm the religious expression. At most, any such
coercion is indirect and de minimis. Finally, the approved religious expression is
nonsectarian in the following sense: it includes general invocations of God and
religious faith, but it does not reflect (at least not in the Supreme Court's estima-
tion) a governmental preference for Christianity or any other specific religion.
Based upon this analysis, it appears that the exception is extremely narrow and
that it requires that each of three conditions be satisfied: first, that the practice is
a widely accepted and longstanding historical tradition; second, that it is prima-
rily and essentially symbolic, not coercive; and third, that the government's pro-
motion and endorsement of religion is general and nonsectarian in nature.
So understood, this implicit exception appears to rest on a distinctive mix of
constitutional values. In particular, the value of historical tradition or custom is
added to the balance, and it acts as a partial counterweight to the Establishment
Clause values that generally support a strong prohibition on governmentally
sponsored religious expression. Those general Establishment Clause values are
not abandoned altogether in this setting. For example, religious voluntarism re-
mains important. Thus, no governmental practice can fit within the exception if
it is coercive in any serious way. Religious equality remains important as well, but
here it is enough that there be equality between and among religions. Sectarian
preferences are forbidden, but more general governmental preferences for reli-
gion over irreligion are permissible in this context. As a result, the exception does
not honor the value of religious equality in its fullest sense. The exception also
tends to impair other constitutional values that the Supreme Court's general doc-
trine would protect. In particular, the exception tolerates governmental practices
that do not fully respect the identity of irreligious citizens and that therefore might
undermine the religious inclusiveness of the political community. Yet the impair-
ment of these customary Establishment Clause values is mitigated by the absence
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND SYMBOLISM
of coercion. Moreover, the preservation of historical tradition properly informs
the Establishment Clause. It is a constitutional value in its own right, a value that
is entitled to substantial weight and serious consideration.
I believe that my analysis offers a persuasive account of this narrow corner
of the Establishment Clause. Thus, I believe that there is an implicit exception to
the Supreme Court's customary Establishment Clause doctrine; that it is limited
to a select group of governmental practices that are historical, symbolic, and
nonsectarian in nature; and that the exception is the product of a distinctive
blend of constitutional values. It also is important to emphasize, however, that
the Supreme Court has not adopted my account. Indeed, the Court has not for-
mally recognized a doctrinal exception of any sort. The Court's lack of clarity
has created considerable uncertainty and confusion-not only concerning the
precise scope of any exception, but also concerning the prior question of whether
a doctrinal exception indeed exists. To further examine these questions, let us
consider two contemporary controversies. The first is an actual controversy in
the United States. It concerns a highly publicized constitutional challenge to the
Pledge of Allegiance. The second relates to French opposition to religious lan-
guage in the proposed European Constitution. This controversy raises the hypo-
thetical question of whether the contemporary enactment of similar language in
the United States would violate the Establishment Clause.
In its 2004 decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,53 the Su-
preme Court confronted-but avoided-an Establishment Clause challenge to
the "under God" language in the Pledge of Allegiance, which reads in full as fol-
lows: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty
and justice for all." The decision under review was a two-to-one ruling by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Over the dissenter's protest, the Ninth Circuit
sidestepped Supreme Court dicta approving the pledge and declined to recog-
nize an implicit doctrinal exception along the lines I have suggested. Rather, the
court applied the Supreme Court's conventional Establishment Clause doctrine
and found a constitutional violation. In its initial opinion, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the congressionally adopted "under God" language violated the
Lemon and endorsement tests.54 The court's decision triggered a public outcry, as
well as petitions for rehearing en banc. With nine judges dissenting, the Ninth
53. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
54. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 E3d 597, 602-12 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Circuit denied rehearing en banc,5 5 but the original three-judge panel issued an
amended opinion that narrowed the court's holding to the public school setting.
In this second opinion, the court avoided a general ruling concerning the "under
God" language. Instead, citing concerns about the coercion of impressionable
children, the court ruled only that public schools could not sponsor recitations of
the pledge that include this religious language.56
Under the Supreme Court's conventional Establishment Clause doctrine,
the Ninth Circuit's opinions were perfectly reasonable, including not only the
court's second opinion, but also its first. For the government to declare and to en-
courage the idea that the United States is a nation "under God" is, by every indi-
cation, an action that promotes and endorses religion in violation of the Lemon
and endorsement tests.5 7 If the Ninth Circuit was mistaken, it was not in its in-
terpretation of the Supreme Court's conventional doctrine. Rather, it was in the
court's decision to apply that doctrine, unmodified, in this particular context.
In the Supreme Court, only eight justices participated, Justice Scalia having
recused himself. By a vote of five to three, the Court avoided the Establishment
Clause issue by reversing the Ninth Circuit on procedural grounds. The major-
ity opinion concluded that the Establishment Clause issue was not justiciable be-
cause the challenger (a parent with limited and disputed custodial rights) lacked
"prudential standing" to bring the case in federal court.5 8 The majority's justicia-
bility ruling was plausible but novel, leading the three justices who dissented on
this point to suggest that the majority was improperly evading the Establish-
ment Clause issue. Although each offered different reasoning, these three jus-
tices would have reversed the Ninth Circuit on the merits by declaring that the
"under God" language does not violate the Establishment Clause, not even in
the public school setting. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was doctrinally am-
biguous, but it implied that the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine permit-
ted a history-based exception somewhat along the lines I have posited.59 justice
55. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 321 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003).
56. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 485-90 (9th Cir. 2002) (amended opinion, filed
Feb. 28, 2003).
57. See Steven G. Gey, "Under God," the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional Trivia, 81
N.C. L. REV. 1865,1872-97 (2003). But cf Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Lim-
ited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2003) (suggesting, with caveats, that "under God" might be de-
fensible under the Establishment Clause as the statement of a religious rationale for limited
government and human rights).
58. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11-18.
59. See id. at 25-33 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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O'Connor sounded similar themes, but she also concluded, remarkably enough,
that the "under God" language-understood as a historical and descriptive
reference-does not endorse religion and therefore satisfies the endorsement
test, eliminating the need for a doctrinal exception." Justice Thomas, by con-
trast, argued that the Court's conventional doctrine would clearly require inval-
idation, but he contended that this doctrine should be substantially modified,
not only for historical practices but also more generally.6" In light of the Court's
justiciability ruling and the divergent reasoning of the justices who would have
reached the merits, the Establishment Clause question remains open.62
The Court's apparent reluctance to decide this issue is not surprising, be-
cause even if I am right about an implicit doctrinal exception, the Pledge of Al-
legiance does not present an easy case. The "under God" language is
nonsectarian, so it meets that condition. In addition, it dates back to 1954, giving
it a substantial, fifty-year history. But other historical traditions, such as legisla-
tive prayer, are much older, and, indeed, the tradition of the pledge is not unam-
biguously religious. The pledge was first conceived in 1892, without the
contested language, and its history as an entirely secular statement therefore is
longer than its history with the "under God" addition of 1954.63 Moreover, one
could argue that the pledge falls outside the exception because it is impermissibly
coercive, at least when recited in public schools. The Supreme Court has
squarely ruled that public schools cannot directly compel objecting students to
recite the pledge,' but that case predated the "under God" language and there-
fore did not present an Establishment Clause issue. In the Establishment Clause
context, the Court has not approved school-sponsored prayer even when the
prayer is formally voluntary. Instead, it has been concerned about the indirect
and subtle coercion, including peer pressure, that can arise when teachers or
other school officials ask children to participate in a group exercise. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor emphasized in Newdow, however, the
60. See id. at 33-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. See id. at 45-54 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
62. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision, lower courts have reached conflicting re-
sults in addressing this issue. Compare Myers v. Loudon Co. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2005)
(upholding daily recitation of the pledge in public schools), with Newdow v. Congress, 383 F.
Supp. 2d 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (relying on prior Ninth Circuit ruling in Newdow to conclude, in
renewed litigation, that this practice violates the Establishment Clause).
63. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 6-7.
64. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Pledge of Allegiance is not a prayer or religious exercise. It is a patriotic exercise
that includes a brief and general religious reference or declaration.S Moreover, a
student who objects only to the "under God" language is free to remain silent
during that portion of the pledge. These factors mitigate the concern about co-
ercion, because they reduce the threat to religious voluntarism. As a result, per-
haps it is enough that students cannot be directly compelled to recite either the
"under God" language or the pledge in general. Overall, the Establishment
Clause issue is debatable, but the implicit exception might very well apply.
We can further explore the implicit doctrinal exception by considering a hy-
pothetical question: Would the Establishment Clause permit (for example, in a
state constitutional amendment) the contemporary enactment in the United
States of religious language like the language that France opposed for the pre-
amble to the proposed European Constitution? Along with other opponents,
France acquiesced to a statement that the European Union "draw[sl inspiration
from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe,"' but it resisted
any reference to God or Christianity, even in terms of historical influences.6 7 Is the
French position consistent with the American understanding of church-state sep-
aration, as embodied in Establishment Clause doctrine, or is the French position
more strongly separationist? Note that the question here is whether the Establish-
ment Clause would forbid religious language such as the language that France
opposed; quite clearly, nothing in the First Amendment would require the gov-
ernment to promote or enact this sort of religious language.
The precise content of the religious language would be critical to this in-
quiry. For present purposes, perhaps the most interesting proposal was for lan-
guage that did not mention Christianity, thereby avoiding the issue of sectarian
65. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 30-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 38-43
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
66. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe pmbl (July 18, 2003), available at http:/
/european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf.
67. Although France played a leading role in crafting and promoting the proposed European
Constitution, its citizens later rejected it in a referendum that had the effect of killing the consti-
tution, at least for the time being. There is no indication that the issue of religion was a significant
factor in the French vote. See Elaine Sciolino, French No Vote on Constitution Rattles Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2005, at Al. Within days after the French referendum, the proposed constitution
also was rejected in the Netherlands. See Richard Bernstein, 2 'No' Votes in Europe: The Anger
Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,2005, at Al. The United Kingdom then suspended its plans for a ref-
erendum, and European leaders put the ratification process on hold. See Alan Cowell, Britain Sus-
pends Referendum on European Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at A8; Elaine Sciolino,
European Leaders Give Up on Ratifying Charter by 2006, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at A3.
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preference. Under this proposal, the preamble would have stated that the values
of the European Union "include the values of those who believe in God as the
source of truth, justice, good and beauty as well as of those who do not share such
a belief but respect these universal values arising from other sources." ' Al-
though one could argue otherwise, this language can be understood to endorse
religion. Even so, the endorsement is general. The language invokes God, not
Christianity or any other specific religion, and it therefore would qualify as non-
sectarian. Moreover, the statement is entirely symbolic. The language would ap-
pear in a constitutional preamble, not a substantive constitutional provision.
Furthermore, the last part of the statement suggests that irreligious citizens em-
brace different understandings of truth and are entirely free to do so. In any
event, this language would not coerce anyone, directly or indirectly, to do or say
anything inconsistent with his or her own religious or irreligious beliefs.
Although this language would qualify as nonsectarian and noncoercive, the
contemporary enactment of comparable language in the United States would
appear to fall outside the implicit exception because the language would repre-
sent newly adopted religious expression by the government, rather than religious
expression embodied within a longstanding historical practice. The exception
rests upon historical tradition or custom as a partial counterweight to other Es-
tablishment Clause values. Moreover, historically embedded governmental
practices-part of the social fabric-might impair some of those customary
values to only a modest degree. In particular, dissenters might be somewhat
more willing to tolerate historical practices as imbedded features of the status
quo, not contemporary statements of disrespect, and this in turn might reduce
the risk of their alienation from the political community. But if no historical tra-
dition is present, this argument is unavailable. More generally, the counter-
weight disappears. As a result, the customary Establishment Clause prohibition
on governmentally sponsored religious expression would render the religious
language unconstitutional.
Conversely, one could argue that my understanding of the implicit excep-
tion is too narrow. Perhaps the weight of historical tradition should be conceived
more broadly, meaning, in the American setting, that specific historical prac-
tices, such as our national motto, "In God We Trust," are merely exemplary of a
broader category of permissible governmental expression. In his separate opin-
68. Thomas Fuller, Europe Debates Whether to Admit God to Union, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,2003, at
A3 (quoting language proposed by delegates from Poland, Italy, Germany, and Slovakia).
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ion in Newdow, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited a range of historical
examples as support for the more general proposition that "our national culture
allows public recognition of our Nation's religious history and character."'6 Pro-
fessor Michael J. Perry has urged a somewhat similar position, contending that
the Establishment Clause prohibition on governmentally sponsored religious
expression does not apply to certain generalized endorsements of religion, in-
cluding statements suggesting that God exists and that human beings are the
sacred product of God's creation.' There may be differences between the
Rehnquist and Perry approaches, but each would appear to permit the govern-
ment to sponsor newly crafted religious expression as long as the expression is
general and nonsectarian, as well as noncoercive. This type of standard seem-
ingly would permit a contemporary governmental statement about God such as
the statement proposed for the European Constitution.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment generally forbids gov-
ernmentally sponsored expression or symbolism that has the purpose or effect of
promoting or endorsing religion. This principle is vigorously enforced, espe-
cially in the public school setting. To this extent, the American approach to reli-
gious expression mirrors French laYcit6, and it is important to emphasize this
fundamental point of agreement. In other respects, however, the American ap-
proach is distinctive. First, there is an implicit exception, albeit quite narrow, to
the general prohibition on governmentally sponsored religious expression. This
exception appears to permit the government to sponsor religious expression that
69. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also Van Orden v.
Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861-64 (2005) (plurality opinion by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that the
Court should reject the Lemon test in the context of a passive monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments and that the government should be permitted to display such a monument as
part of an unbroken history of official governmental acknowledgements of the role of religion in
American life). Cf McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-53 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (contending that the Establishment Clause should not be construed to forbid the government
from favoring religion over irreligion and arguing, in the context of public acknowledgments of
religion, that the government should be permitted to promote a monotheistic conception of God
the Creator).
70. See Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Si&le Sketches, 75 IND.
L.J. 295, 309-11 (2000); Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exercise and Nonestablishment Nons
Forbid? Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom, I U. ST. THOMAs L.J. 549, 564-
78 (2003).
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is noncoercive, nonsectarian, and embedded within (or at least in harmony with)
longstanding historical practices. Second, the American constitutional tradition
offers private religious expression strong protection under the First Amend-
ment's Free Speech Clause, including protection against discriminatory treat-
ment. This Free Speech Clause protection extends to private religious
expression on public property and in public schools.
The American constitutional tradition rests upon constitutional values that
emerged in the founding period, but these values and their implications have
evolved over time. Thus, contemporary interpretations of the First Amendment
inevitably reflect not only the values of the past, but also the societal circum-
stances and understandings of the present. I am not an expert on French la'cit6,
nor on French history or culture. Even so, I have little doubt that the French
conception of la'fcit-like the American constitutional tradition-is a product
of history, of the philosophy and values that this history reflects, and of contem-
porary circumstances and understandings. What follows is a highly tentative ap-
praisal and comparison of our two traditions as they relate to religious
expression. 1
In the American constitutional tradition, the general Establishment Clause
prohibition on governmentally sponsored religious expression is supported by a
number of constitutional values, including religious voluntarism, religious
equality, respect for the religious or irreligious identity of individual citizens,
and the promotion of a religiously inclusive political community. French la'cit6
in the context of religious expression may rest in part on similar values, but it
may also reflect a deeper and more fundamental commitment to secularism in
government and in the public sphere. The French experience is complex, but the
path of French history, from the time of the Revolution, suggests a firm rejection
of religious authority in the public domain, with the sovereignty of the secular
state prevailing in its place. Furthermore, under the influence of Rousseau,
French political and legal theory calls for the state not only to ensure social cohe-
sion, but also to facilitate the exercise of "public freedoms" delimited by law.
72
The American experience, by contrast, is influenced more by Locke than by
71. For a more critical appraisal of both the American and the French approaches, see T. Jer-
emy Gunn, Religious Freedom and La'cit& A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU
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Rousseau. It is more liberal than republican. Unlike the French tradition of
"public freedoms," the American tradition of constitutional rights rests upon a
powerful, if not radical, commitment to the autonomy and sovereignty of the in-
dividual in the exercise of such rights. In the context of religion, moreover, the
sovereignty of the state is likewise moderated by the historical and still prevalent
belief that religious authority is a competing sovereign and that the state and re-
ligion govern different but overlapping spheres of human endeavor.
These differences in history and in prevailing political theory may help ex-
plain the differences between the American and French approaches to religious
expression. The American constitutional tradition includes strong protection
for private religious expression, as a matter of individual right, whereas French
la'icit6 can be interpreted to permit, and perhaps require, the state to control re-
ligious expression in settings such as public schools. French political theory may
call for such control if the religious expression is thought to impair social cohe-
sion or if, as in the case of Islamic headscarves, the religious expression may be
believed to reflect the coercion of religious communities or to threaten the public
value of gender equality. 73 Governmentally sponsored religious expression is a
different matter, and here the United States and France are in broad and general
agreement. Yet the American tradition permits a narrow but conceptually sig-
nificant exception for certain nonsectarian religious expression, expression that
permits the government to affirm the competing and overlapping sovereignty of
religious authority. The French tradition, with its more categorical rejection of
religious sovereignty in the public sphere, seems to require no such exception.
The French and American approaches to religious expression surely are af-
fected as well by contemporary circumstances, including the religious composi-
tion of each society. France is a largely secularized society, with religion playing
a relatively modest role in the lives of most citizens. At the same time, and con-
versely, there is a large Muslim minority that may be seen to threaten French
culture. The United States, by contrast, has resisted secularization and remains
a broadly religious society. More than 90 percent of the American people affirm
a belief in God or a Supreme Being. And some 60 percent-about six times the
percentage in France-claim that religion is very important to their lives.74
73. In fact, the French response to the headscarf issue has evolved over time, and the proper inter-
pretation of laiciti in this setting is controversial. See Belier, supra note 48; Jacques Robert, Religious
Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REv. 637, 645-47; Gunn,supra note 71, at 452-79.
74. See Jay Tolson, The Faith of Our Fathers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 28/July 5, 2004,
at 54.
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND SYMBOLISM
What the Supreme Court wrote of America in the 1950s is equally true to-
day: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing.' 5 This statement captures both the contemporary vitality of religion in the
United States and its historical and continuing role in the American constitutional
tradition. It helps explain why the American approach to religious expression re-
flects not indifference, but governmental neutrality, and, indeed, a qualified neu-
trality that may tilt slightly in religion's favor.
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